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Abstract
Wang and Jin explore  the differences  in pollution  management  among the different types of  ownership.
control performance  of industries with different types of  The authors also conducted  econometric  analyses  on the
ownership in China-state-owned  (SOE),  collectively- or  determinants  of pollution  discharge performance.
community-owned (COE),  privately owned (POE),  The results show that foreign direct investment and
companies with foreign  direct investment (FDI), and  collectively-owned  enterprises have better environmental
joint ventures. About  1,000 industrial  firms  in three  performances  in terms of water pollution  discharge
provinces of China were surveyed,  and detailed  1999  intensity,  while state-owned enterprises  and privately
firm-level  information was obtained.  owned enterprises  in China are the worst performers.
The authors analyzed  the differences between  firms in  The results also  suggest that collectively-owned
receiving and reacting to environmental  regulatory  enterprises in China do internalize  environmental
enforcement,  community pressure,  environmental  externalities.
services,  as well  as in the firm's internal environmental
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This paper explores the relationship between industrial ownership and environmental
performance.  Developing countries have been witnessing reforms of state-owned enterprises
(SOE), a rapid growth of private sectors (POE) and a steady increase of foreign direct
investment.  The economic performance  of SOEs deteriorated  in most countries in the 1970s and
1980s as global markets fueled  competitive pressures (World Bank, 1996)2.  The poor
performance  and relatively decreasing impact on the national economy of SOEs have been
driving many governments to explore new ways for their SOEs to be re-organized,  governed and
operated. Three main avenues, corporation and restructuring, bankruptcy,  and divestiture, have
been implemented to raise the efficiency  and profitability of their SOEs. The belief is that with
more efficient resource allocation  and better business performance of private sectors,
privatization  is being used in most of developing countries in order to promote economic  growth
in the last few decades (Frydman  et al,  1997; Boardman and Vining,  1989; Claessens et al,  1997;
World Bank,  1991).
The question then is whether this global privatization process is good for the environment.
While private sectors are solely profit oriented, public  sectors such as SOEs normally take more
social impacts into their decision making processes.  Therefore, while economically  inefficient,
SOEs'  environmental  performances could be theoretically better than the private  sectors', others
being equal.
Besides  SOEs and POEs, countries such as China are also practicing  another ownership
structure, which is of collectively or community owned (COE)3. While responding to the market,
COEs are supposed to intemalize their environmental externalities  for the local communities,
2 World Bank (1996) summarized  the performance  of some developing countries as follows:  (1) from 1985 to 1991,
SOEs in Turkey on average earned only half as much as  the largest 500 private industrial  enterprises  in Turkey; (2)
in Viet Nam, there were  12000 SOEs existing in 1990. But 2000 SOEs had ceased operation or been liquidated,
another 3000 had been merged, and 20% of remaining SOEs were estimated to be losing money in 1994; (3)  in
Kazakhstan the gross SOE losses rose from  14.1% of GDP  in 1992 to 23.7% of GDP by 1993; and (4)  the loss of
SOEs in Argentina reached  9% of GDP in 1989 while SOEs's share of total public debt stood at 50%.
3Those enterprises are called "township  and village  industrial enterprises" or TVIEs  in China.
3while SOEs are supposed to internalize their externalities  for the whole nation. Therefore, the
environmental  performance of COEs should also be better than that of POEs.
There are few systematic  studies on the relationship between the ownership  structure and
environmental performance.  To fill this gap, this study selects three regions in China - Danyang
of Jiangsu Province,  Liupanshui of Guizhou Province and Northern Tianjian Municipality, where
plant-level surveys and plant manager interviews were conducted.  All major industrial firms in
each region were included in the sample.  Detailed plant-level information such as production,
material  inputs, employment, pollution discharges and emissions,  compliance with standards,
pollution levies and fines paid, environmental  inspections and complaints received,  etc., in the
year of 1999, were collected. Answers to the questions related to plant operation, perception of
environmental  quality, pollution control effort of the plant and the govemnment,  effectiveness of
different policy instruments and enforcement efforts, community pressure, environmental
services and markets,  intemal environmental  management, etc. were received from plant
managers.
Five different types of ownership in China - SOE, COE, POE, foreign directly invested
(FDI) companies as well as joint ventures, were analyzed in this study.  Analyses focused on the
differences in receiving and reacting to environmental regulatory enforcement,  community
pressure, environmental services as well as in firm's internal environmental management among
different types of ownership. Econometric  analyses were also conducted on the determinants of
industrial pollution discharge  intensity.  The results show that FDIs and COEs have better
environmental  performance,  implying that COEs do internalize their environmental  externalities,
because otherwise, the environmental performance of COEs should be worse than that of POEs.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews previous studies conducted
in this area and presents a theoretic analysis of how ownership can affect  a company's
environmental  performance.  Section III provides some background  information about China's
industrial pollution control, the survey design and implementation, as well as the survey results.
Section IV provides econometric  analyses of industrial environmental performances,  and Section
V concludes  the paper.
4II.  Ownership and Environmental Performance
2.1 Previous Research
Previous studies on the relationship between ownership structure and the environment have
focused on the following issues:
2.1.1 Economic Efficiency
Private sectors may have higher efficiency in resource  utilization. They may produce less
pollution with the same resources. In contrast to SOEs, POEs emphasize economic returns,
which generate a higher requirement for better management.  Therefore, a better environmental
quality could be achieved with greater private sector participation (Kikeri  et. at.,  1992; Schmid
and Rubin,  1995).
2.1.2 Internalizing  environmental externality
Although POEs may have higher efficiency in resource utilization, they may not seek to
internalize environmental extemalities (Baumol  and Oates,  1988).  In other words, the private
sector may compromise the environment  to avoid the potential cost of environmental
investments and expenditures  (Eiser, Reicher and Podpadec,  1996). However, the SOEs and
COEs have their incentives to internalize  the environmental costs resulting from their pollution
discharge, in order to obtain higher national or local social welfare. While a country itself is
heterogeneous  in terms of its geographic,  economic and social characteristics,  the environmental
damage and the internalization  of pollution extemality within  a region are obviously different
from that within a nation. However, no empirical  studies have been conducted  on the existence
of the possible behavior of internalizing environmental  externalities.
2.1.3 Bargaining  powers in regulatory  enforcementEnvironmental bargaining power is defined as an enterprise's capacity to negotiate with the
local or national environmental agencies pertaining to the enforcement of  pollution control
regulations  such as pollution charges,  fines, etc. Due to the difference of ownership structures,
enterprises may have significantly differentiated impacts on the local or national economy and
politics, or they may have different relationships with the local environmental  authorities and
govermments.  These differences can lead to the different levels of bargaining power. For
example, SOEs in China have strong connections with the governments  and some managers of
SOEs have higher political status than the local environmental authorities.  As a result, SOEs are
able to elicit a lower pollution payment or punishment; and they have less incentive to decrease
their pollution and reduce the pollution intensity. Similarly, COEs in China are strongly
connected with the local governments,  and they are also equipped with relatively higher
environmental bargaining powers in contrast to the private enterprises.  Wang et al. (2001) have
empirically demonstrated  the lower bargaining power of  POEs as compared with SOEs and
COEs.
Bargaining  powers with communities
Firms with different ownership may receive different  levels of informal regulation,  or
community pressure, on pollution abatement.  Informal regulation  may always exist whether or
not any formal regulation is present or effective  in developing countries. In this view, local
communities may have struck their own Coasian bargains with neighboring plants. Leverage in
negotiations is provided by social pressure on workers and managers,  adverse publicity, threat
of violence, resources to civil law, etc. The effect of community pressure on emissions has been
confirmed in several empirical studies (Pargal and Wheeler,  1996; Wang, 2000), which found
that proxies for direct community pressures (community income and education levels) have
significant effects on plant level emissions. Dasgupta and Wheeler (1996)  show that there is a
significant correlation between the number of complaints  and the pollution emission, and
consequently the quality of environment.  But whether a community takes environmental action
or at what level the informal regulation and community pressure are effective to pollution
control, possibly depend on the impacts of a certain enterprise on the regional economy.  There
is an inherent trade-off by local residents in choosing an optimal pressure level to impose on a
certain enterprise taking into consideration the potential economic benefits from their job
6opportunities, income expectations,  and the environmental  and social costs of production
externalities.
FDI  with better technologies
Foreign direct investment in developing countries may, or may not, generate more pollution. The
increase of foreign direct investment and an emergence of foreign companies and other joint
ventures in developing countries naturally raise the 'question about whether the "pollution
havens" hypothesis4 holds. If it holds, then more severe industrial pollution and environment
degradation will be a result of an increase of direct foreign investment and plant re-allocations
(Kalt,  1988; Low and Yeats,  1992; Xing and Kolstad,  1996; Mani and Wheeler,  1997). However,
most of the empirical studies do not find significant evidence to support the hypothesis including
the comprehensive survey by Dean (1992). Rather, FDIs generally hold adyanced technologies,
and therefore, the environmental performance of FDIs may be better than domestic enterprises.
The direction and the level that ownership structure can affect environmental  performance
depend on the magnitudes of the effects summarized above.  A few of the empirical studies have
tested the relationship between the ownership structure and environmental  performance
(Anderson,  1995; Kikeri, Talukdar and Meisner,  2001). Particularly,.Talukdar  and Meisner
(2001), using annual data for 44 developing countries from 1987 to  1995, show a significantly
negative relationship  between the degree of private sector involvement  in terms of its investment
in the total domestic investment, national  GDP, or its value of output share in the national GDP,
and C02 emission levels. A conclusion drawn  from this study is that an increased  role by the
private sector in an economy is more likely to help the environment of the economy. There are
some very recent empirical  investigations into the relationship between ownership  and
environmental  performance at the factory level (Wang and Wheeler,  2000). These studies show
that SOEs are more likely to pollute than private enterprises.
4 The pollution haven hypothesis states the possibility of pollution-intensive  activities re-
allocating  to developing countries with less stringent environmental  standards.
72.2 A Theoretic Analysis
To analyze the differences in the environmental performance of industrial firms with
different types of ownership, one may group firms into three categories:  SOE, COE and POE, as
defined before.  Foreign companies may be viewed as private companies because they share the
same profit maximization objectives.  Joint ventures may have mixed ownership and their
environmental  performance may be in between.
A company's pollution discharge decision may be modeled by assuming that the company is
to minimize the total cost subject to an output constraint. The total cost has three components:  1.
total cost of factor inputs within the company,  including the pollution abatement cost; 2. total
pollution discharge penalty paid to the government authorities;  3. total pollution discharge
damage incurred by society.  For private companies,  the first two components are real costs to
them and they may treat the third component as zero. For collective or community companies,
the social damages may be included  in their objective function but may be considered only up to
the extent where the local communities are concerned. However, for state owned companies,  the
total social damage to the whole state may be considered.
The production and pollution abatement decisions can be made by solving the following
optimization problem:
mi  Wy X + a(I)P(Z)  + r(I)D(Z)  s.t.  Y(X, I) < y
0  if I = l(for POE);
y()  =  Di (Z) / D (Z)  for i = 1,2...  if I = 2(forCOE);
I1  if I = 3(forSOE).
D(Z)=.Di(Z)
where I represents ownership with I=1  for POE, I=2 for COE and I=3 for SOE;
X is a vector of factor inputs with a price vector of Wx;
Z is pollution discharge which is a function of X and I; i.e., Z=Z(X,  I);
P(Z) is the total penalty caused by the pollution discharge as regulated by the governrment;
D(Z) is the total environmental and health damage caused by pollution discharge Z;
8Dj(Z) is the total damage generated by pollution discharge Z upon community i where a COE
belongs to; and y is the output.
a(I) represents the fact that firms with different types of ownership may receive different
penalties even with the same pollution discharge Z; y(I) represents the fact that different firms
may internalize pollution externalities differently. A private company does not consider this
component,  and a collective company only considers damages to their own community, while a
state owned company may internalize the damage to the whole nation. The ownership variable I
is also included in the production function Y (X, I), which reflects the differences  in production
efficiency with different ownership.  0 <= a(I) <= 1, and 0 <=  y(I) <=1.
The optimal level of input x is given by the following first-order condition:
Wx  + a(I)  aP(z) az(x,I) +  8(y(I)D(z)) OZ(x,I)  A  OY(x,I)
az  ax  +  ax  ax
market price  marginal cost  marginal environmental  marginal production
of factor input  of pollution penalty  damage internalized
where X is the Lagrangian multiplier. For a state owned company,  the optimality condition of x is
achieved  when the value of marginal production equals the total marginal price, which equals the
summation of the market price,  the marginal environmental penalty to the company and the
marginal damage to the society. For a collective company, the marginal  damage is only
considered up to its hosting local community, while for a private company, the environmental
damage part is not considered at all.
In the following, the first-order condition will be employed to analyze the effects of production
efficiency, regulatory bargaining power and internalization of environmental externalities  on the
environmental performance  of POEs, COEs and SOEs. During the analyses, the following
assumptions have been made:
a.  Others being equal, an input with a lower total marginal price will be utilized more;
9b.  The marginal cost of pollution penalty is positive; i.e.,  ap( ) >0;
az
c.  The marginal cost of pollution damage is positive; i.e.,  D(z) >0;
d.  0<=a(I),y(I)<=1.
2.2.1 Regulation Effects
Assuming that the difference  in environmental performance is only from regulation. This implies
that the efficiency effects and the internationalization  effects are assumed to be zero or the same
for all different types of ownership. Then, when the intemalization  effect is zero, the marginal
price of the same input for companies with different types of ownership would be as follows:
MCl =Wx + a(l) aP(z) aZ(x)  for POE
&z  ax
MC2 =Wx +  a(2) OP(z) OZ(x)  for COE
z  ax
MC3 =Wx + a(3) OP(z) OZ(x)  for SOE
Oz  OIx
Where 1 is denoted for POEs, 2 for COEs and 3 for SOEs. The differences between the marginal
prices will be only in the coefficient a(I). For a private company, the coefficient would be the
highest, and close to 1. A state owned company may have the lowest coefficient. Thus we have:
a(l) > a(2) >a(3) >0.
For inputs with positive marginal pollution discharges, i.e.,  (x) >0, the marginal prices of the
Ox
inputs are the highest for a private company.  Less inputs would be used, and therefore less
pollution would be emitted by a private company. For inputs with  (  ) <0, the marginal prices
are the lowest for a private company, the therefore more pollution reduction inputs would be
used. Ultimately, the environmental performance of a private company can be the highest.
10For a state owned company, the situation is the opposite.  More pollution generation inputs and
less pollution reduction inputs would be used. Therefore, the environmnental  performance of a
state owned company would be the worst. The performance of a collectively  owned company
would be in between.
In summary, if only govemment environmental  regulations are considered,  the environmental
performance of a POE would be better than that of a COE, and a COE is better than a SOE. The
primary reason is that the bargaining powers with govemment authorities are the strongest for
SOEs and weakest for POEs.
2.2.2 Internalization  Effects
Assume the strength of environmental regulation  is the same for all companies,  and the only
difference in the marginal prices of inputs are caused by the intemalization of the pollution
extemality.  Then the marginal prices of the inputs will be as follows.
MC1 =Wx  + a(l) ap(z) aZ(x)
Oz  ax
MC2 =Wx +  a(l) aP(z) AZ(x)  + aDi(z) AZ(x)
az  ax  8z  &x
MC3 =Wx +  a(l)  aP(z) aZ(x) +9D(z)  aZ(x)
az  x  8z  x
Di(Z) is only a fraction of D(z), and therefore,  ai(z) <_  D(-).  For a pollution generating
t3z  8z
input, i.e.,  az(x) >0, the marginal price for a state owned company will be the highest.  But for a
ax  ~  ~~Zx
pollution reduction input, i.e.,  <()  c0, the price would be the lowest for a SOE. Therefore, a
SOE would use more pollution reducing inputs and less pollution generating inputs, and it would
be the best. environmental performer.  A collective company would be the second best, while a
private company would be the worst.2.2.3 Efficiency Effects
Efficiency is not included in the model above, but a conclusion about efficiency can be fairly
straightforward.  For an input x positively contributing to pollution discharge,  i.e.,  aZ(x)  >0, a
higher efficiency means a lower marginal discharge of such an input. For an input negatively
contributing to pollution discharge,  i.e.,  (x) <0, the higher efficiency means a higher marginal
ax
pollution reduction.  Therefore  a higher efficiency means a less pollution generation and a higher
pollution reduction, and finally better environmental performance. If POEs have higher
efficiencies than COEs and SOEs, the environmental  performance of POEs would be the best.
2.2.4 Combination and  Discussion
Situations would be complicated if all of the above determining effects are combined. The
differences in environmental performance of firms with different types of ownership are
generally unpredictable,  and the results would be an empirical issue.
While empirical  studies have been conducted on the efficiency effect and the regulation effect,
no studies so far have been completed on the existence of the internalization of environmental
externalities. However, a testable hypothesis can be constructed in the following.
Without considering the possible internalization of environmental externalities  by SOEs and
COEs, the environmental  performance of POEs should always be superior to that of SOEs and
COEs, because both the efficiency effect and the regulation effect are positive with POEs'
environmental performance,  when all other factors  such as technology,  scale, sector, etc. are the
same. Only the existence of internalization  effect can make the environmental performance of
SOEs and  COEs better than that of POEs. If this is correct, then a finding that the performance  of
SOEs or COEs to be better than that of POEs could mean the existence of the intemalization
effect.
12The empirical study on China presented below does show that the environmental  performance of
COEs are better than that of POEs, which could imply that those community owned enterprises
do consider the possible pollution damages they generate  to society in their decision making
process.
III.  China Survey and Statistics
To investigate the ownership effects on environmental performance,  an enterprise level survey
has been conducted in China. Before presenting the survey and the survey statistics, the
following provides some background  information  about the industrial pollution control in China.
3.1.  Policy  Background
China's industrial growth has been extremely rapid in the past two decades. The annual
growth rate has been about  15%  in the 1990's. This has lifted tens of millions of people out of
poverty.  However, serious environmental  deterioration has accompanied  this rapid growth. Many
cities in China have been among the worst polluted urban areas in the world5.
China has been adopting various policy measures to control industrial pollution6, which
include command-and-control  approaches,  administrative measures, economic instruments, as
well as public infonnation and campaigning.  New sources are subject to environmental  impact
assessment policy and "three simultaneous"  policy, which requires pollution abatement facilities
be designed,  installed and operated simultaneously with industrial production process
technologies.  Pollution discharge standards have been designed  and implemented for different
industries, different  pollutants and different areas. Air, water and land have been classified into
different zones according to environmental sensitivities, where different ambient and discharge
standards are enforced.
For more information,  see World Bank (1997  & 2001).
6 For more detailed discussions,  see Sinkule and Ortolano (1995) and World Bank (2001).
13The pollution charge has been one of the most important pillars of the industrial pollution
regulatory system in China.  This policy instrument was originally designed to promote
compliance with pollution discharge standards.  The Chinese environmental protection law
specifies that "in cases where the discharge of pollutants exceeds the limit set by the state, a
compensation  fee shall be charged  according to the quantities and concentration of the pollutants
released."  In 1982, after three years of experimentation,  China's State Council began a
nationwide implementation of pollution charges.  Since then billions of yuan (US$1 = 8.2 yuan)
have been collected  each year from hundreds of thousands of industrial polluters for air
pollution,  water pollution, solid waste, and noise. In 2000, the system was implemented in all
counties and cities. Five billion yuan were collected  from more than half a million industrial
firms; and numbers are increasing  each year. Although studies have been conducted to reform
the levy system with most analysts recommending  an increase in China's pollution charge rate,
few empirical analyses have actually investigated  the polluters' response to the existing charges.
In Wang and Wheeler (2002), province-level  data on water pollution was analyzed and it was
found that China's levy system had been working much better than previously thought. The
results suggest that province-level pollution discharge intensities have been highly responsive to
provincial  levy variations.
3.2. Survey  Design  and Implementation
To study the pollution control behavior of Chinese industries and to investigate the
ownership  effects on environmental performance,  we conducted  a plant-level  survey in China in
the year of 2000. Three areas (Northern Tianjin, Danyang, and Liupanshui)  were selected to
conduct the survey. These three areas were selected because of their wide differences in social,
economic and environmental  conditions (see table  1), their significances  in collective and private
sector development,  and their governments'  support for conducting the research. Danyang
municipality is located in a relatively rich, southeast province, Jiangsu province, while
Liupanshui municipality  is a part of a poor southwest province,  Guizhou province.  The northem
part of Tianjin was also selected for this study, which is a relatively more urbanized,  rich area,
14where the environmental  situation is more serious than other two areas because of its dense
population, even though the absolute quality is in between.
All major industrial polluters in each area were included in the sample. Plant-level
information was collected from three channels. The first source is the municipal  environmental
protection agencies. All polluters are required to register  each year their pollution related
information  with the local environmental  authorities. Various ways, including surprise
inspections and material balance estimation, etc., have been practiced by the local authorities  to
check the accuracy of their data. A questionnaire was also designed and implemented to collect
information for those variables which were not included in the pollution registration practice.
Personnel responsible  for a plant's environmental management were required by the local
authorities to submit the information.  A plant manager survey was also conducted to collect
subjective information on perceptions  and attitudes toward environmental  quality, policy
enforcement,  as well as environmental services.
The survey was conducted between April and September,  20007. Detailed information was
collected  from 905 industrial plants.  Plant surveys were distributed by three survey coordinators
in each of the three areas.  Returned surveys received quality checks from the survey teams
before they were recorded into computer for analyses. Manager surveys were conducted by
interviewers.  Plant managers were summoned to the designated  interview sites by the local
environmental authorities,  but the questionnaires  were finished anonymously without
government officers observing the interview process.
3.3. Statistics
Table 2 shows the number of industrial enterprises included in the sample, by survey site,
ownership  as well as industrial sector. SOEs and private enterprises took the largest proportions
7 The data collection work was supported by the World Bank and China State Environmental  Protection
Administration (SEPA).  Local environmental protection authorities in the three survey areas participated in the
survey design and imnplementation processes.  The survey teams were comprised of researchers from SEPA's Policy
Research Center, Nanjing University, Beijing Normal University, as well as Guizhou Provincial Institute of
Environmental Protection.  The team members participated  in the survey design and questionnaire pretests, were
trained by the principal  investigator,  a survey expert,  and conducted  the survey.
15in the Liupanshui sample, while collective enterprises accounted for approximately 60% in
Northern Tianjin and Danyang samnples. There were more private companies and less SOEs in
Danyang than in the Tianjin sample. Tianjin and Danyang were mainly engaged in the chemical
sectors; while Liupanshui had a higher proportion in the mining industry. SOEs in the sample
were highly concentrated  in mining and chemicals,  while foreign companies were more engaged
in textile and metal industries,  and joint ventures in the chemical  and equipment sectors.
Table 3 presents the statistics of major economic and environmental  variables. It is clear that
the SOEs are generally bigger than other types of companies, while the private companies  are the
smallest in terms of scale.  While there were much higher investments  in pollution abatement
facilities with SOEs, operation expenditures with collective enterprises were much higher than
other types of industries.
Pollution discharge intensities and concentrations  are given in Table 4. For air pollution (S02
and TSP), the SOEs' intensity is much higher than other types of companies.  Collective
enterprises have higher TSS intensity for water pollution.  In terms of concentration,  the water
pollution discharges from the private companies are the highest. The performance  and
compliance information are presented in table 5. SOEs violated the emission standards the most.
SOEs and the joint ventures, most of which have SOE components, are among the worst
performers.  Collective enterprises have the lowest violation rates.
Table 6 shows that private companies received environmental  inspections the most,  even
though the scales of private companies  are among the smallest (table 3). More SOEs and private
companies received citizen complaints  on pollution issues (table 7). The levy payment ratios of
SOEs are lower than the collective and private companies  (table 8). More SOE managers feel
that the enterprises are damaging the environment  and that there are strong pressures from the
government and the communities to further abate pollution (table 9).
IV.  Econometric Analyses
16The survey statistics presented in last section demonstrate the differences in environmental
enforcement and performance of Chinese industries with different types of ownership.  In this
section we further investigate the determinants of environmental performance, focusing on the
roles of ownership.
4.1 The models
Performance indicators selected for the analyses in this study are pollution discharge
intensities.  Based on previous studies (e.g., Pargal and Wheeler,  1996), the following sets of
determinants are identified and included in the analyses:
(1)  Environmental policy and external pressure
Variables in this category include the pollution charge rate, inspections,  citizen complaints,  as
well as dummy variables for environmental zones where environmental standards are less
restrictive if an enterprise is located in an industrial zone. Average charge rates (charge per unit
of pollution discharge), average complaint rates (complaints per company) and average
inspection ratios (inspections  per company) in the year before (i.e.,  1998)8 at the town level (the
lowest government unit in China) are used in the econometric  models, and they are expected to
have negative impacts on pollution discharges.
(2)  Input  prices
Prices of water use, electricity, coal and wages may also affect pollution discharge.  Depending
on whether or not they are substitutes or complements to pollution abatement, they may affect
the pollution discharge positively or negatively.
(3)  Characteristics
This set of variables includes the sector, vintage, scale,  location as well as ownership.
Ownership is the focus of this analysis,  which includes SOEs, collective,  private,  foreign  as
8 Data in the year of 1998 are used in order to control potential endogeneities.
17well as joint ventures. The level of technology  is difficult to acertain in this context and is not
available for this analysis. However,  the possible technology effect can be expected  to be
controlled by the inclusion of sector dummies,  vintage and scale.
4.2 The Results
Table  10 presents the econometric  estimation results. Estimation results are provided for two
conventional water pollutants: total suspended solids (TSS) and chemical oxygen demand
(COD).  The dependent variables are pollution intensities (pollution divided by value of output)
in log terms.
The citizen complaint  variable, an indicator of informal regulation, defined  as complaints on
water pollution received  in 1998 in a town divided by the total number of polluting firms in the
town, shows a strong negative impact on TSS intensity. The elasticity is about 1.7,  which
demonstrates  the strong existence of informal regulation in China.  The result on COD intensity is
not significant, which is consistent with the understanding  that citizens can only perceive
pollutants such as TSS and that COD is not directly observable.
The pollution charge variable also shows strong, significant negative impacts on pollution
intensities, which is consistent with previous empirical findings conducted in China (Wang and
Wheeler, 2000 and 2002). The elasticity of the pollution charge with respect to TSS and COD
intensities are 0.33 and 0.28 respectively.  The visits of government officials to the polluting
firms have a positive impact on COD intensity and an insignificant effect on TSS intensity. This
is counterintuitive,  if the visits are interpreted as the efforts of the government in enforcing the
environmental  laws. But if the number of visits represent a close relationship between
government officials  and the polluting companies,  the story could be quite different.  A further
investigation on the nature of the official visits to the polluting companies  in China seems
warranted.
The input price variables show that the higher the water price, the higher the pollution discharge
intensities, which is true for both TSS and COD. The price of electricity has a positive
correlation with TSS discharge and negative  correlation with COD discharge.  This is consistent
18with the understanding that the consumption of electricity is positively related with TSS
treatment,  while the treatment of COD may not consume as much electricity.  The price of coal is
negatively correlated with TSS discharge, which could imply that a smaller consumption of coal,
the less the TSS discharge. The worker's wage does not have any significant correlation with
pollution discharge intensities.
For variables  representing firms' characteristics,  ownership does contribute to difference in
pollution intensities. For TSS, SOEs9 have the highest discharge intensities,  followed by POEs,
COEs and the FDIs and joint ventures.  While the difference between SOEs and POEs is not
significant,  all others are statistically significant. However, results for COD are not significant.
Scale effects are clearly shown for the two pollutants; the bigger the firms, the lower the
pollution discharge intensity.  The number of years in operation does not show a significant
effect, while  some water pollution intensive sectors give positive results. Plants located in
industrial zones have higher pollution discharge  intensities, which is consistent with the fact that
pollution discharge standards  in the industrial zones are less restrictive.
V.  Summary
This study analyzes the ownership effects on industrial environmental performance.  Economic
efficiency, production and pollution abatement technology, willingness  to internalize
environmental  externality, bargaining power with governrment  as well as with community in
environmental  enforcement have been identified as the major reasons why firrns with different
types of ownership  perform differently in terms of pollution discharge. The private sectors, both
domestic and foreign invested in a developing country, may have higher economic efficiencies in
resource utilization, but may have fewer incentives to internalize  environmental externalities  and
less bargaining power in environmental  enforcement.  State-owned and collectively owned
enterprises have a higher willingness  to internalize  environmental  externalities and a higher
bargaining power in environmental  enforcement,  however the economic  efficiency may be
lower. Therefore the overall ownership effect is an empirical  issue.
9  SOE is a default variable in the model.
19The empirical study conducted in China provides consistent results with the theoretical analyses
and the previous empirical studies. The results show that state-owned  enterprises have the worst
environmental performance, with the domestic private enterprises as second. The best performers
are foreign companies which have the lowest pollution discharge intensities.
The Chinese collectively owned enterprises have a significantly better performance in pollution
reduction than the domestic private sector. If management efficiency with the private sector is
not lower than the collective sector, which is generally believed to be true, this empirical result
could imply the existence of the phenomenon of intemalizing environmental  externalities with
the collectively or community owned enterprises,  since other possible performance determinants
have already been controlled  for in the model.
The study also finds that the pollution charge instrument is effective in terms of  providing
incentives for pollution reduction.  This is confirmed by previous empirical studies.  Citizen
complaints  are found to have a strong positive role in pushing polluters to reduce pollution
discharges. This shows a great potential to use community pressure approaches  to promote
industrial pollution control in China.
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22Table 1. Sample Areas
Sample area  Liupanshui  Tianjin  Danyang
Per Capita GDP (yuan)  2,700  15,900  16,100
Average  workers'  wage (yuan)  5,700  6,800  6,900
S02 concentration (ug/nm3)  75.9  23.3  25.2
TSP concentration (ug/m3)  134.2  158.4  231.6
Table  2: Sample Structure by Ownership and Sector
By Ownership  By Sector
Location  SOEs  Collective  Private  Foreign  Join  Total  Mining  Chemical  Mental  Water, gas &
No.  power
Guizhou  99  41  122  2  12  276  104  47
(LiuPanshul)  (36%)  (15%)  (44%)  (1%)  (4%)  (38%)  (17%)
Tianjin  39  159  27  6  28  259  41  40
(15%)  (61%)  (10%)  (2%)  (11%)  (17%)  (17%)
Jiangsu  21  185  82  3  16  307  68  47
(Danyang)  (7%)  (60%)  (27%)  (1%)  (5%)  (22%)  (15%)
Total  159  385  231  11  56  842  106  116
(190/0)  (46%)  (27%)  (1%)  (7%)  (13%)  (14%)
23Table 3: Economic and Environmnental Profile by Ownership (in 1999)
Category  Variable  Joint  Total  N
SOE  Collective  Private  Foreign  Venture  average
Economic  Output value:  6.3  2.0  1.3  3.6  4.6  2.8  744
variables  10 million yuan  (17.7)  (6.1)  (5.3)  (3.6)  (8.6)  (9.4)
Total value of assets:  246.2  790
Ttvae  s 24  1.0  0.5  1.2  15.6  (78.4)
10 million Yuan  (175)  (5.1)  (1.9)  (1.3)  (77.2)
Employment:  307  821
986  151  116  326  256  (1Q49)
Persons  (2191)  (331)  (357)  (516)  (363)
Environmental  Fixed environmental  686  77  21  10  297  194  630
variables  assets: 10,000 Yuan  (3706)  (458)  (112)  (15)  (1334)  (1735)
Environmental  77  439
investment 10,000  324  51  4  0  8  (602)
Yuan  (1231)  (492)  (10)  0  (18)
Environmental  16  486
Operaton costs:  34  16  3  2  10  (130)
10,000 Yuan  (122)  (173)  (21)  (2)  (26)
Waste water  1.52  1.09  1.17  0.75  1.07  1.22  204
treatment facility: set  (0.86)  (0.44)  (0.89)  (0.50)  (0.39)  (0.70)
Pollution  TSS:  1000 tons  16.8  9.5  3.4  8.1  22  10.1  641
(77.5)  (104.3)  (39.6)  (22.8)  (111.7)  (84.1)
COD:  I1000 kg  165.6  8.1  7.6  1.3  13.9  41.2  635
(794.1)  (33.6)  (45.2)  (3.1)  (39.9)  (369.6)
S02: tons  274,243  277  34  72  14.382  55153  608
(2948,465)  (2,812)  (186)  (156)  (87,573)  (1310199)
TSP: tons  1925  0.71  3.18  0.06  1.00  69
(6969)  (1.15)  (8.17)  (0.10)  (1.14)  (3145)
Note:  Data are averages by category. Standard varlances are shown in the parentheses.
Table 4: Pollution Intensity by Ownership
Variable  Intensity of labor  Intensity of output  Emission concentration
Unit  Ton/person  Ton/ 10,000 yuan  ±g/l  gg/m3
Pollutant  TSS  COD  S02  TSP  TSS  COD  S02  .TSP  TSS  COD  S02  TSP
16.8  144.1  19.4  0.7
SOE  (129)  (97)  (88)  (76)  2.5  21.4  3.2  0.2  310  353  2097  440
34.9  119.8  1.2  0.01
Collective  (56)  (97)  (41)  (17)  2.9  8.2  0.11  0.0  178  282  1426  124
15.8  115.9  0.5  0.3
Private  (50)  (77)  (40)  (5)  1.6  11.2  0.06  0.1  956  426  2548  113
0.0  11.2  0.4  0.0
Foreign  (9)  (9)  (9)  (9)  0.0  0.1  0.03  0.0  288  168  3018  150
venture  5.2  63.9  0.3  0.02  0.1  1.1  0.01  0.0  142  114  1258  150 vnue (16)  (21)  (16)  (4)
Note: The numbers of firms by ownership are shown in the parentheses.
24Table 5: Environmental  performance  and compliance by ownership (%)
violated  exceeded  did not  did not submit  Discharge  did not assess  did not have
emission  emission  pay their  their emission  outlet did  their  specific
concentration  quota  levies on  report  not meet  environmental  environmental
standards  time  standard  impact  staff
SOEs  64  80  47  42  45  61  62
Collecitve  45  44  40  39  40  44  48
Private  44  63  28  26  50  60  56
Foreign  40  50  60  50  50  50  70
Joint  60  64  60  60  60  61  65
Total  49  58  40  37  40  53  54
Table 6: Average numbers of inspections over all the sampled firms
SOE  Collective  Private  Foreign  Joint  Venture  Total average
National Inspections  0.11  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.10  0.06
Provincial inspections  0.62  0.26  0.26  0.10  0.30  0.33
Municipal, County and Town Visits  2.98  1.71  3.54  1.54  1.77  2.45
Regular Visits  3.35  3.62  8.16  2.18  2.93  4.76
Table 7: Citizen complaints
SOEs  Collective  Private  Foreign  Joint Venture
Percent of firms who  Water pollution  4.40  0.78  2.60  0  1.79
received complaints
Air pollution  2.52  1.04  1.73  0  1.79
Average Number of  Water Pollutlon  0.39  0.01  0.16  0  0.13
complaints  Air Pollution  0.09  0.03  0.02  0  0.09
25Table 8:Levy Payment (actual payment/required  payment)
SOEs  Collective  Private  Foreign  Joint  Total
Levy payment for wastewater discharge  0.77  0.85  0.88  0.60  1.00  0.86
Levy payment for air pollution  0.69  0.72  0.80  1.00  0.81  0.74
Levy payment for solid waste  0.00  0.50  1.00  1.00  N.A  N.A
Table 9: Managers'  Self-evaluation  of Environmental  Performance  and Pressure
(% of yes)
Ownership
Question  SOEs  Collective  private  Foreign  Joint  total
venture
Damaging environment?  55  34  36  13  46  40
Meet requirements?  89  89  74  80  93  85
Better than others  in the same  64  63  48  87  62  62
sector?
Pressure  from communities?  71  59  48  60  43  42
Pressure  from government?  78  33  36  47  31  31
Total number of firms  221  379  231  15  59  905
26Table 10: Estimation Results of Pollution Intensity Equations a of TSS and COD
Variable name and description  TSS  COD
Ownership:  Collective  -0.63***  -0.04
(-2.06)  (-0.15)
Private  -0.15  0.23
(-0.46)  (0.71)
Foreign and joint venture  -0.91 ***  -0.07
(-2.14)  (-0.16)
Policy variables:  -1.69**  0.25
Complaint (town average  in 1998)  (-3.56)  (0.53)
Official  Visit (town average in  1998)  0.06  0.89***
(0.23)  (3.34)
Levy (town average  in 1998)  -0.33**  -0.28***
(-3.78)  (-3.28)
Input price:  water price  1.43***  0.99**
(4.63)  (3.20)
electricity price  I.51 ***  -0.76***
(4.04)  (-2.04)
coal price  -1.31***  -0.09
(-2.99)  (-0.22)
worker wage  0.32  -0.15
(0.90)  (-0.43)
Scale:  fixed capital  -0.22***  -0.17***
(4.08)  (-3.23)
Technology:  years of operation  -0.10  0.21 *
(-0.69)  (1.47)
Location:  Industrial  zone  1.89*  0.30*
(1.29)  (0.80)
Sector:  Mining  0.78***  0.30
(2.07)  (0.80)
Food  1.68***  1.45***
(3.94)  (3.48)
Textiles  -0.16  0.41
(-0.36)  (0.01)
Leather  1.03  0.70
(0.87)  (0.59)
Fiber  0.82  -1.52*
(0.78)  (-1.46)
Paper  3.64***  1.74**
(3.50)  (1.67)
Printing  0.04  1.00*
(0.06)  (1.40)
Petroleum  -0.83  1.04*
(-1.14)  (1.43)
Chemicals  0.24  0.28
27(0.74)  (0.86)
Pharmaceuticals  1.70**  -1.21
(1.64)  (-1.17)
Rubbers  0.32  -0.73
(0.40)  (-0.91)
Plastics  0.10  -0.56
(1.25)  (-0.70)
Non-ferrous  -0.21  -0.07
(-0.36)  (-0.12)
Smelting  0.16  -0.33
(0.41)  (-0.84)
Mental  0.42  0.07
(1.16)  (0.19)
Equipment  0.53*  0.08
(1.33)  (0.20)
Power, gas and water  2.27***  0.88*
(3.98)  (1.51)
Number of observations  517  517
Adjusted R-square  0.52  0.14
***, ** and * represented  for 5%,  10%  and 15%  confidence level.
a pollution intensity is defined as pollution discharge / value of output.
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